This article dissects debates about the "immigrant youth" over time, using the difference between stationary and non-stationary processes as the primary analytical tool. Using Sweden as an example, we show that the Swedish debate for decades was non-stationary, basically consisting of a number of independent and largely uncorrelated debates. The stationary, firmly placing immigrant youth as an originating principle in the debates, thus basing it on essentializing principles, is seen as a recent phenomenon. The wider implications of this change, for example with respect to multicultural ambitions, are outlined.
Introduction
The purpose of this article is not biographical, but the lines above serve to illustrate that the IMER field, with respect to both policymaking and research, has not been marked by continuity and step-wise progressions. In fact, examining IMER research and policy-shaping in a perspective spanning the last 30 to 40 years reveals that understanding this history requires more than a prosaic focus on actual immigrant situations, their "problematics," and their possible policy solutions. As I will try to illustrate in this article, in the IMER field, neither policymaking nor research can meaningfully approach its task as if it were a stationary target. For reasons of space, the empirical material will be largely confined to migrant youth concerns and with Sweden as a geographical pivot point. However, the argument is meant to have a much wider external validity.
Stationary and non-stationarity in IMER issues
The distinction between stationary and non-stationary processes is fundamental to the argument presented here. A stationary process has something that makes the process revert to values expressing its essential qualities. The stationary therefore expresses itself constantly; it can be seen as an "originating principle". The nonstationary, on the other hand, stands for a process where for example,
some elements in what used to govern the process are discarded and others are added. Utilizing this simple dichotomy on immigrant issues, as objects of research and policymaking, will help elucidate some important features of conceptualizations in discourses about migrants.
The stationary in migrant youth discourse(s) in Sweden over the last 30 to 40 years, that is, what has been constant, is in fact very limited. Basically, we find two items of interest. One is that migrant youth has been a matter of political and scholarly concern -issues related to it are a constant, not necessarily very inflamed, feature.
The second is that Swedish "normality" is somehow affected by migrant youth. Deciding how this normality should be expounded in any detail is no easy task. Perhaps one good way of putting it is that migrant youth is somehow introducing a measure of unpredictabilitywhat does their presence mean in terms of where Sweden will head? Do we (the Swedes) risk losing control over some things with respect to where our society is heading?
If we look at the non-stationary, a very different situation exists. The significant content of the migrant youth label shifts many times. What these varying "significant contents" share is that they (virtually) all focus on issues that are thought of as problems of one sort or another. However, it is crucial to note that political actors and scholars do not see these problems as growing out of each other, or following some single originating principle -if this had been the case, we would have had a stationary process roughly following this logic: migrant youth is ONE problem, remaining fundamentally one problem over time, and we are dealing with its various manifestations.
The logic and substance of the non-stationary
Even if leading politicians in several European countries in the last decade often declared that liberalism, democracy, the rule of law, and perhaps some more items of this nature, are characteristics of their countries' culture, or even European culture, it is striking how nationally specific are the concerns articulated at a less general level 
The problem history of migrant youth
In Sweden, there have been a number of debates about immigrant youth, starting in the 1970s. To some extent they have superseded each other, to some extent they have run co-terminally during specific time periods. To put keyword labels on these debates, as will be done here, will perhaps tend to reduce the appreciation of how intense and occasionally sophisticated they were, and of the amount of research spent on elucidating them. However, the purpose here is not to give a detailed description of these debates, but to define some premises for how our understanding of specific migration-related issues is shaped. It must be remembered, that the issues below were topics of debate, and there were different positions in these debates.
1975/1985: identity development and semi-lingualism
This debate was instrumental in creating and shaping one of the best-known features of Sweden's presumed multiculturalism. The arguments were squarely initiated from scholars, where names such as Skutnabb-Kangas in Stockholm were extremely prominent.
Building on their own work and also authorities such as Cummins in Toronto, the issue was the importance of the mother tongue as the basis for a fully formed identity that also included emotional development. A connected, equally important part of this argument was that proper mother-tongue knowledge was essential for being able to appropriate Swedish. (At this time I applied for a social anthropology faculty position at another Swedish university and my book about First Nations people ("Indians") in Canada was dismissed by the faculty advisor since I had not understood that these people were semi-lingual.)
1980s: the economic dimension
This was not really a major issue with respect to migrant youth concerns, but still there were two aspects worth mentioning. One was if immigrants contributed to the economic wellbeing of Sweden, and the other was if Sweden was developing a dual labor market or moving towards a "vertical mosaic." Here, the prospects for the coming generation were significantly addressed, and social scientists and economists showed that such things as school statistics and Swedish wage formation processes (with strong labor union input) alleviated the concerns.
Early 1980s: time bomb
Inspired not least by products from German researchers (and not necessarily closely read), such as Wilpert, and US ghetto studies, the notion emerged that immigrant youth were, due to dismal school results, employment prospects, etc., in the process of becoming a marginalized part of society, and this marginalization would in due time translate itself into very massively destructive acts directed towards the surrounding society.
Mid-1980s: Swedish values
By this time, refugee reception, as opposed to labor migration, had started to become the overall defining feature of the political and scholarly attention to migrant youth/second generation issues. The "Whole of Sweden" was the major policy development, aiming at dispersing refugees to all parts of Sweden, and all municipalities would get significant grants for each refugee they agreed to settle from reception facilities. In addition, the huge number of empty council-owned flats in virtually every municipality except the major cities would also get let. The philosophy accompanying this policy was that immigrants, and here the focus was also on youth, would 
1990s: ghettoization
The driving issue with respect to immigrant youth/second generation was the overall concern with what happened in the suburbs of the major cities. In a style which I believe many would find pretty typical
of Swedish "applied" social research, the main bulk of the results from a governmental inquiry produced the "facts" and suggested remedies. Although giving some space also to other issues, by far the most importance was attached to standard-of-living indicators and their significance.
1990s-2000: underclass formation, disintegration, gangs, and crime
In this period, perhaps not the first but at least more sustained and powerful arguments about something being fundamentally wrong with immigrant youth come to the fore. A major concern with this category having a major propensity for crime peters out as a report from the Crime Prevention Council (Brottsförebyggande Rådet 1998) finds that second generation immigrants from non-European countries are the least crime-prone statistically identifiable category. The first "populist" party formed around negativism against immigrants makes it into Parliament. It must be seen as initiating a highly energized debate about "Muslims." However, it lasts only one electoral period. Now for the first time, albeit with limited success, the idea of a fundamental incompatibility between Swedes and immigrants, and something the passing of time will not take care of, becomes a feature of public discussion. It is also worth noting, that the label immigrant now really has wandered from being applied to all immigrants, to people of non-European backgrounds and also to people from former Yugoslavia. This period is thus the first where populist politicians have had a very significant breakthrough in moving the conceptual signposts in immigration-related public debates.
2000: multiculturalism backlash, parallel societies, Muslims
What may well be termed the multiculturalism backlash should be understood as a phenomenon with at least seven more specific components, reflecting that migrant youth issues are now becoming totalized. Topics of debate in this period include (1) 
What happened?
Why did we see this dramatic shift in the debates about immigrants?
The "common sense realistic" argument would of course be that "the Swedish people" has finally woken up to the realities facing it, and finds the situation unacceptable. This, at least, is the way that some put it. However, even a cursory perusal of for example, attitude surveys, casts doubt on this argument. But when there are significant local problems, as for example in Rosengård outside Malmö, it is heartening to see local politicians having no problem seeing that this is something which they have to cope with in an instrumental fashion.
It is far too common, given the facts available, to suggest that xenophobic sentiments are expressive of economic distress. Also strongly questioned by Sides and Citrin (2007) is the idea that xenophobic sentiments result from interaction with immigrants.
Instead, it appears that the Swedish pattern with respect to where 
